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SITUATION

II

VISIT BY AND INTERNMENT OF
AIRCRAFT
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral.
(a) The 17 aga, a cruiser of stat.e Y, launches a plane,
the Ya-10, 'vhich locates a n1erchant vessel of state X,
the . .Yala, on the high seas and by radio orders the X ala
to proceed to the Y aga. '"fhe X ala gives no evidence of
receiving the 1nessage.
1. The X ala starts zigzagging in the opposite direction.
2. The X ala stops and remains stopped.
3. The Xala apparently kno"~s that a cruiser of X is
approaching, and the cruiser can be seen from the
17 a-10.
''That should be the action of the Ya-10, if each of the
above supposed conditions arise?
4. Would the same action be taken under identical
conditions in the case of the N ela, a merchant vessel
of neutral state N?
(b) What should be the action of Ya-10, if the same
orders had been in a message dropped on the deck and
picked up by an officer of the respective merchant
vessels?
(c) .A carrier-based plane, Pa-11, of state Y is engaged in operations against state X.
1. The Pa.--11 is pursued by an aircraft of state X
and is flying within three miles of state K. The aircraft of state X is over the high sea. State K has prohibited the flying of belligerent aircraft 'vithin its juris-
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diction, and a patrol Yessel and an aircraft of state K
are near.
2. The Pa-11 enters port N of state 0 in order to take
fuel :from a naval tanker of state Y.
3. The Pa-11 enters port P of state R and alights on
the Yerna, an aircraft carrier, 'vhich entered port P two
hours earlier and :fron1 'vhich the Pa-11 had flo,vn three
hours before the I ..e1na entered the territorial 'Yaters of
state R..
'Vhat action 1nay the neutral authorities law·:fully
take?
SOLUTION

(a) 1. The 17 a-10 should not use force agajnst the
Xala till certain that the Xala has received and understood the sum1nons. When certain that summons has
been receiYed and is understood, the 17 a-10 may use force
sufficient only to bring the X ala to the Y aga under
escort, or in case of persistent or active resistance the
Ya-10 may sink the Xala, after assuring the safety of
passengers, cre'v, and papers.
2. The Ya-.10 should not use force against the Xala
till certain that the X ala has received and understood the
sum1nons. ''rhen certain that summons has been received and is understood, the Y (J;-10 may use force sufficient only to bring the X ala to the 17 aga under escort~
or in case of persistent or active resistance the Ya-10 1nay
sink the X ala, after assuring the safety of passengers,
crew·, and papers.
3. The Ya-10 should not use force against the Xala
till certain that the X ala has received and understood
the stunmons. 'Vhen certain that summons has been
receiYed and is understood the Y ar-10 may use force sufficient only to bring the X ala to the 17 aga under
escort. If the 17 a-10 decides not to incur risk fro1n the
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approaching cruiser of X, the Y ar-10 may take no further action in regard to the X ala.
4. If a merchant vessel of neutral state N, the LVela,
should be summoned by theY(};-10 under conditions identical to ( 1), ( 2) ~ and ( 3) above, the same action may be
taken.
(b) The commander of the Ya-10 being already certain that the summons is received, should also be certain
that it is understood, when he may proceed as in (1),
(2), (3), and (4) above.
( o) 1. State I( should use due diligence to intern the
Pa-11, an aircraft of state Y.
2. State 0 should use due diligence to intern the Pa-11,
an aircraft of state Y, and if the tanker of state Y has
:furnished fuel to the Pa-11, should intern the tanker.
3. State R should request the Yema to turn over the
Pa.-11 for internment and if the request is not granted,
should use due diligence to intern the Yema with the
Pa-11 on board.
NOTES

Changing rules.-New methods of warfare introduce
ne'v problems. It is not usually the case that the rules
for the use of new methods are adopted in advance. It
also requires some knowledge of the manner in which the
new method works before suitable rules may be devised.
In spite of the novelty of a new instrun1ent of 'var, the
principles of its use may be 'veil established. l\1any of
the principles embodied in "Lieber's Code" (General
Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, 1863,) are
jllustrative of rules previously existing, which in the
forn1 given by Lieber are, 'vith fe,v modifications, continuing to the present day. The principles of the law
of n1ariti1ne w·ar stated by Lord Sto,Yell early in the
nineteenth century were regarded as binding in courts of
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the t'Yentieth century. Some of these p1·inciples "·ere
disregarded during the 'Vorld '';ai'. though often the
argun1ents put forth for disregarding early precedents
'vere not valid.
Such principles as that the use of 1naterials "·hich
cause unnecessary suffering should be prohibited "·ere
J·egarded as of universal acceptance. That poison should
be prohibited 'vas generally appro\·ed. The reason for
prohibiting the discharge of projectiles from balloons in
the late nineteenth century 1-ras largely lack of effectiYe
control in directing the movements of the aircraft. This
'Yould n1ake the aim and course of the projectiles uncertain and create an undue risk for innocent population.
As aircraft becan1e perfected and their n1o\·en1ents could
be reasonably controlled, the restrictions upon their use
correspondingly changed.
The argtnnent so1netimes adv-anced to the effect that
because an instru1nent of ·war is 'veak in respect to defense, it is entitled to special consideration either fron1
the ene1ny or fron1 a neutral, certainly has not receiv-ed
much support.
ar is a contention of strength and if
either belligerent uses instrun1ents 'vhich are ·weak~ not
self-sufficient, or to "·hich the belligerent cannot furnish
adequate support, such instrument is not entitled to exceptional consideration from the neutral. and ''"ill not
recei Ye it from the opposing belligerent. .
Air power.-As there is great difference of opinion
as to "'Yar as an instrument of national policy", so there
is "·ide difference as to the use of an air force in 'var.
Certainly the use of the air has modified the conduct
of "·ar, even though opinion is not uniforn1 as to "·hat
extent and in "·hat respects modification has taken place
and n1ust take place. There is not agree1nent either as
evidenced in discussion of or in appropriations for air
equipment.

''r

REGULATIONS AND AIRCRAFT

39

In some early "\vars land :forces have been the main
and determining :factor, in others surface sea po,Yer, in
the "\7\Torld War :for a time subsurface sea :force was
threatening to dominate, and no"~ air :force is an incalculable :factor, but uncertainty as to the issue is often a
stimulus to war.
Gunpo,Yder, torpedoes, mines, and subn1arines haYe
at different periods in history been hailed as the last
'Yord in ''ar, as aircraft are no"? considered by son1e.
Thus :far in history man as an animal o:f n1any inYentions has sho"rn a defensive mentality eomn1ensurate to
the offensive, though sometimes a little delayed.
Aircraft.-The introduction o:f aircraft as a 1neans of
"~ar:fare greatly modified the conduct o:f "~ar upon the
earth surface, on the 'Yater as "\veil as on land. The
earlier rules :for warfare ",.ere concerned 'Yi th surface
combat. These rules could not in every instance be
extended by analogy to aerial "Tar:fare, because the :forn1s
of "~ar:fare ""ere not analogous. There was an attempt
on the part o:f some 'Yriters to extend the three mile
1naritin1e jurisdiction doctrine to the superjacent air.
In this attempt the early recognition o:f the :fact that
the la'' o:f gravity did not act horizontally and Yertieally
in the same manner destroyed the analogy. Differences
in speed and in other respects introduced other coinplications in atte1npts to extend maritime and land rules to
the air. Aircraft were coming more and more to be
used in ""ar ; therefore rules had to be devised.
The v·vorld "\Var experiences and proble1ns contributed
valuable basal data :for the determination o:f the nature
o:f possible regulation o:f use o:f aircraft. The equipn1ent o:f aircraft with radio introduced other problems.
Hague limitations on aerial warfare, 1899, 1907.-.A.t
tin1es there have been movements advocating the prohibition o:f aerial warfare or of the use of aircraft in war
except for purposes o:f observation and signaling.

•
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'Vhile other restrictions were advocated as aircraft became n1ore perfected, there was little limitation upon the
object :for 'vhich the aircraft n1ight be used, but son1e
restriction upon the method of use ""as demanded in
order that there might not be a risk disproportionate
to the advantage. It ~ight be reasonable to restrict the
use of certain specified agencies in 'Yar :for a time until
their operation could be better kno,vn, and it might be
essential to prohibit the use of other instrtunentalities
immediately.
··nrhile the principle that the use in 'var of instruInents or n1aterials that 'vould cause unnecessary suffering should be prohibited might meet general support in
an international conference, it is not certain that an
instrument, "·hich at a given date ""ould be in the category of those 'Yhich might cause unnecessary suffering,
""ould ren1ain in that category. At the Hague Conference of 1899 certain types of bullets ""ere prohibited, and
it 'vas also proposed to prohibit the discharge of projectiles :from balloons. In discussing this proposal Captain (General) Crozier, of the American Delegation,
said:
"1.'he general spirit of the proposals that have received the
favorable support of the subcommission is a spirit of tolerance
with regard to methods tending to increase the efficacy of means
of 1naking war and a spirit of restriction with regard to methods
which, without being necessary from the standpoint of efficiency,
have seemed needlessly cruel. It has been decided not to impose
any limit on the improvements of artillery, powders, explosive
materials, muskets, while prohibiting the use of explosive or
expanding bullets, discharging explosive material from balloons
or by similar 1nethods.
"If we examine these decisions, it' seems that, when we have
not imposed the restriction,-it is the efficacy that we have wished
to safeguard, even at the risk of increasing suffering, were that
indispensable.
"Of the two cases where restrictions have been imposed, the
first, the prohibition of making use of certain classes of bullets,
proceeds exclusively from a humanitarian sentiment, and it is
therefore reasonable to suppose that the second has its basis in
such a. sentiment. Now, it seems to me difficult to justify by a
humanitarian motive the prohibition of the use of balloons for
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the hurling of projectiles or other explosive Inaterials. 'Ve are
without experience in the use of arms whose e1nployment we
propose to prohibit forever. Granting that practical means of
using balloons can be invented, who can say that such an invention will not be of a kind to make its use possible at a critical
point on the field of battle, at a critical moment of the conflict,
under conditions so defined and concentrated that it would decide
the victory and thus partake of the quality possessed by all perfected arms of localizing at important points the destruction of •
life and property and of sparing the sufferings of all who are
not at the precise spot where the result is decided. Such use
tends to diminish the evils of war and to support the humanitarian considerations which we have in view.
"I do not know of machines thus efficient and thus humanitarian, in the incomplete stage of development in which aerostation now is; but is it desirable to shut the door to their possible
introduction among the permitted arms? In doing so, would we
not be acting entirely in the dark, and would we not run the risk
of error inherent in such a manner of procedure? The balloon,
as we know it now, is not dirigible; it can carry but little; it is
capable of hl;lrling, only on points exactly determined and over
which it may pass by chance, indecisive quantities of explosives,
which would fall, like useless hailstones, on both combatants antl
noncombatants alike. Under such conditions it is entirely sui~
able to forbid its use, but the prohibition should be temporary
and not permanent. At a later stage of its development, if it be
seen that its less desirable qualities still predominate, there will
still be time tu extend the prohibition; at present let us confine
our action within the limits of our knowledge.
"That is why I have the honor to propose the substitution of
the following text for the text already voted:
"'For a period of five years from the date of the signature of
this act it is forbidden to employ balloons or other similar means
not yet known for the purpose of discharging projectiles or explosives.'" (Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, 1899.
Carnegie Translation, vol. III, p. 354.)

On July 29, 1899,
following effect:

a Declaration was

signed to the

"The Contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a term of fiye
years, the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons
or by other new methods of a similar nature." (32 Stat. 1839.)

By its provisions this Declaration would tern1inate on
July 29, 1904. This was during ··the Russo-Japanese
War. Both Russia and Japan observed the provisions of
the Declaration, ho,vever, to the end of the war. When
it 'vas proposed at the Second Hague Conference in 1907
to renew this declaration, M. Louis Renault, the able
delegate fron1 France, said:
1820-37-- 4
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·'The method of discharging the projectiles makes little difference. It is lawful to try to destroy an arsenal or barracks
whether the projectiles used for this purpose comes from a cannon or fron! a balloon; it is unlawful to try to destroy a hospital
by either 1nethod. That, in our minds, is ·the essential idea to
be considered. The problem of aerial naYigation is progressing
so rapidly that it is impossible to foresee what the future holds
for us in this regard. One cannot! therefore, legislate with a
• thorough knowledge of the question. One cannot forbid in advance the right to profit by new discoYeries which would not in
any way affect the 1nore or less humanitarian character of war
and which would permit a belligerent to take effective action
against his adversary, while respecting the requirements of the
Hague Regulations." (Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, 1907. Carnegie Translation, vol. III, p. 147.)

. .£\.t the Second Hague Peace Conference, 1907, it 'Yas
also proposed by the Italian and Russian de legations to
1nake restrictions requiring clirigibility of aircraft 'vhich
n1ight drop projectiles. The forn1 was as follows:
"It is forbidden to throw projectiles and explosives from
balloons that are not dirigible and manned by a military crew.
''BOinbardment by 1nilitary balloons is subject to the same restrictions accepted for land and sea warfare, in so far as this
is compatible with the new method of fighting." (Ibid., p. 28.)

There 'Yas only about a t"·o-thircl Yote of the membership of the Conference in support of either proposal.
It wns also ~::tated that
"On account of the distinct character of its hvo articles, the
German delegation asked that they be separated, observing, as
regards the first, that it was possible to throw projectiles from
noi!dirigible balloons, and further, that there was no connection
between the power to direct balloons and that of throwing projectiles from them." (Ibid.)

In discussing the Italian-Russian proposal it was set
forth that the 1899 Declaration in regard to discharge
of projectiles fron~ balloons reflected the uncertainty
existing at the tin1e in regard to the use of balloons and
that "~ith light and powerful motors in prospect in 1907
it 'Youlcl be futile to try to limit the la ,v:ful use of aircraft.
'I'he Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 proposed in its Final Act:
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"The Contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a period extending to the close of the Third Peace Conference, the discharge
· of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new
Inethods of a similar nature."

The only change from the 1899 Declaration 'vas in
fixing a period to the close of the Third Peace Conference which was projected for 1915, at which time the
orld vVar was in progress. As the Declaration was
not · generally ratified, it has since 1907 received little
consideration.
Rule on sub1narines.-During the World War,
1914--18, the submarine was for the first time extensively
used. Claims were made that it should not be required
to conform to rules long aecepted for warfare upon the
sea, that as it could not take on board the passengers
and crew of a visited vessel, it might dispense with visjt,
and torpedo a vessel without even summoning the vessel. The structure of the submarine is relatively light
and not suitable for defense against projectiles. The
subn1arine is also relatively slow and relies upon its
underwater protection £or effectiveness. It is no'Y
agreed that the submarine does not for this reason haYe
any special rights in war. The London Naval Treaty
of 1930, Part IV, Article 22 provides:

''T

''The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:
"(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to
which surface vessels are subject.
'' (2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to
stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or
search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not
sink or render incapable of navigation a 1nerchant vessel without
having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place
of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as
a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew js
assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a
position to take them on board." ( 46 Stat. (Pt. 2), 2858.)

This principle 'vas 1nore ''idely accepted in 1936 as the
Frene h and the Italian GoYerntnents deposited their
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ratifications of Part IV with the British Government on
X oYeinber 6, 1D36. In a protocol of the same day, the
states parties to Part IV, fro1n that ti1ne, the United
States, Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain and
Xorthern Ireland, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan,
Xe'Y Zealand, and South Africa, requested the British
Govern1nent to communicate the rules to all the Po"-ers
not signatory to the Treaty of London with an invitation
that they accede to Part IV "definitely and 'vithout limit
of tin1e.''
Rules on aircraft.-Thus thei:e have been fron1 tin1e to
time suggestions that aircraft, because of the nature of
their construction, the space in which they operate, their
speed, and other considerations, be given special exemptions. For a ti1ne the doctrine of freedom of the air "·as
a slogan meaning the freedon1 of all air. Then this freecloin \Yas clain1ed by some for air above a certain zone in
all areas. N O\Y by n1any agree1nents it is conceded that
freedon1 of the air does not extend outside the lin1its of
the air above the high seas and some contend that as
elevation enlarges the range of vision the jurisdiction of
the coast state should be extended to a corresponding
degree.
There has been a clain1 that the speed of aircraft and
their 'veakness should give to them special privileges in
tin1e of ''ar. The aircraft gains from speed an advantage somewhat comparable to that which the submarine
gains from its underw·ater movements. Under present
development o:f aircraft, the taking on board of the passengers and cre'v of a visited merchant vessel would be
less feasible than for a submarine. The aircraft is dependent upon the supply of fuel at comparatively short
intervals and fuel bases are of capital importance.
Interference with neutral commerce, 1914.-There was
tnuch correspondence upon the 1natter of interference
'vith neutral commerce in the early
davs
of the "\Vorld
.,
'
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'Var. There were many differences of op1n1on upon
contraband, blockade, unneutral service, visit and search,
capture, destruction, etc.
Soon after the beginning of the "~ar the diversion of
ships and cargo became a subject of diplomatic notes.
To a request of the A1nerican Secretary of State of
August 13, 1914, the American Ambassador in Great
Britain replied on August 18:
"Sir Edward Grey informs me that the British Govern1nent will
consider claims of A1nerican shippers whose cargoes destined for
ports of British enetnies are diverted to British .ports and sold.
If such claims for loss by such diversion be established, the
British Government will in due time pay them." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914, Supplement, p. 305.)

During August and September 1914 there had been
n1uch correspondence on the diversion of American shipping to British ports, and after protests by the American
Govern1nent as to delays of ships and cargoes the British
Government proposed to do, and asserted that they
'Yere"doing all in their power to ensure that innocent neutral cargo
shall be restored to its owners with as little delay as possible, and
thnt the unavoidable inconvenience to neutral Inerchants shall be
Ininimized so far as possible." (Ibid., p. 316.)
~fr.

Van Dyke, the An1erican Minister in The Netherlands, sent a telegran1, 'vhich was receiYed in vVashington, October 2, 1914, as follows:
"\Ye desire to protest energetically against measures taken hy
belligerent governments regarding shipments consigned us from
the United States which have resulted in the Holland-A1nerica
Line refusing to accept cargo intended for us unless consigned
to the Dutch Government. "re feel that A1nerican honses are
entitled to conduct their business direct with their branches without interference as long as the goods clearly bear the neutral
origin, character, and destination and are transported to neutral
destination by neutral carriers. \Ve are willing to sign a declaration to the effect that we are the consignees of the respective
goods; that they are or will be sold to our custmners in the
Netherlands exclusively or for reexportation to such countries
only as are not at war. This declaration should fully cover the
requirements of all belligerents." (Ibid., p. 317.)
·
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lr orld lVar opinions. J{J14.-.A.s early as October 9.
1914, the . A.cting Secretary of State of the United States
gaYe a reply to a query regarding the destruction of ships
of belligerents engaged in transportation of neutral
.!!oocls bet"·een neutral ports:
"The practice of nations in the past, stated generally, has been
to sink prizes of war taken on the seas if either the ship or any
part of her cargo was neutral property only when military necessity made this course imperatiYe. This practice has now been
embodied, at least in part, in the rules on the subject laid down
by the DeclaJ·ation of London, which Germany appears to ha\e
adopted for her guidance in the present na\al warfare, and on
which she has presumably based her action in this instance. It
is not to be presumed, however, that the German Government will
refuse to grant indemnity for neutral property which has been lost
in such manner and which would otherwise ha\e been restored by
a court of prize." (Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, p. 319.)

In the case of the Glit1,a before the German prize court
on July 30. 1915. it "~as said:
"As regard the condition of naval warfare ill particular there
i" no protection either general or specific afforded to neutral merchandise by article 3 of the Paris declaration against the acts
of the belligerent party resulting from the circumstances of the
war. Article 3 referred to abo\e is intended to afford protection against the prize law to which, u~to the time of the Paris
declaration, neutral merchandise in the enemy ship was exposed. 'Vhatever the circumstances of the war demand, must
he permitted to take place without regard to the fact that neutral merchandise is on board the ship. If, according to article
2 of the Paris declaration, the neutral flag protects enen1y Inerchandise. this does not mean that 'ice versa the ene1ny ship 1s
to be protected by neutral merchandise, protected in the fir.~t
place. perhaps only against destruction, but by the same token
in innumerable cases against any exercise of the prize law."
"As far as can be ascertained. no one has disputed this e\en
clown to the most recent time.'' (1922 Na\al 'Var College. InterJ 1:1 tional Law Decisions, p. 35.)

Briti.-;h interference 1cith A1nerican 1ne1"chant vessel:s,
1.914.-'ro,Yard the end of Dece1nber 1914 the Governlnent of the United States sent a long note to the British
GoYern1nent stating its attitude on the conduct of British
authorities to"?ard An1erican shipping. 'Vhile assuring
the British GoYernn1ent of its friendly spirit. the An1erican GoYenunent did not "?ish its silence on certain
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British practices to be construed as acquiescence in an
infringen1ent upon neutral rights when American goods
destined for neutral ports 'Yere taken into and long detained in British ports, even when the goods were des·
tined to named persons in a state guaranteeing nonexportation of contraband. The American Government
considered the interference with American commerce
had been of a character "not justified by international
hnv or required under the principles of self-preservation."
The A1nerican note called attention to British in con~
sistencies in the application of announced British policies particularly as regards contraband. This note of
December 26, 1914, further stated that:
"The Government of the United States readily admits the full
right of a belligerent to visit and search on the high seas the
vessels of American citizens· or other neutral vessels carrying
American goods and to detain them when there is sufficient evidence to justify a belief that contraband articles are in their

but His :Majesty·s Government, judging by their own
experience in the past, must realize that this Government can not
without protest per1nit American ships or American cargoes to be
taken into British ports and there detained for the purpose of
searching generally for evidence of contraband, or upon presuinption created by special municipal enactments which are clearly at
variance with international law and practice.
"This Government believes and earnestly hopes His 1\Iajestv·s
Government will come to the same belief, that a course of conduct more in conforn1ity with the rules of international usage,
which Great Britain bas strongly sanctioned for 1nany years, 'vill
in the end better serve the interests of belligerents as well as those
of neutrals.
"Not only is the situation a critical one to the commercial interests of the United States, but many of the great industries of this
country are suffering because their products are denied longestablished markets in European countries, which, though neutral, are contiguous to the nations at war. Producers and exporters, steamship and insurance companies are pressing, and not
without reason, for relief from the menace to transatlantic trade
which is gradually but surely destroying their business and
threatening them with financial disaster.
"The Government of the United States, still relying upon the
deep sense of justice of the British nation, which has been so often
Inanifested in the intercourse between the two countries during so
n1any years of uninterrupted friendship, expresses confidently the
hope that His :Majesty~s Government will realize the obstacles and
difficulties which their present policy has placed in the way of
cargoes~·
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commerce between the United States and the neutral countries of
Europe. and will instruct their officials to refrain from all unnecessary interference with the freedom of trade between nations
which are sufferers, though not participants, in the present conflict; and will in their treatment of neutral ships and cargoes
conform more closely to those rules governing the maritime relations between belligerents and neutrals, which haT"e received the
sanction of the civilized world, nnd which Great Britain has, in
other wars, so strongly and successfully adYocated." (Foreign
Relations, U. S., 1914, Suppl., p. 374.)

British policy, 1914-16.-Sir Ed,vard Grey (later Viscount Grey of Fallodon) carried on the negotiations in
regard to contraband and other controversies arising with
foreign states early in the World War. Such arguinentative notes as that of December 26, 1914, sent by the
American Government required reply, but the reply was
not always in form of an adequate legal defense. Of
so1ne of this correspondence 'vhile ~ir. Walter H. Page
'vas American Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey said:
"The Na\y acted and the Foreign Office had to find the argument to support the action; it was anxious work. British action
provoked A1nerican argument; that was met by British counterargument. British action preceded British argun1ent; the risk
was that action might follow American argument. In all this
Page's advice and suggestion were of the greatest value in warning us when to be careful or encouraging us when we could safely
he firm.
"One incident in particular remains in my memory, Page came
to see me at the Foreign Office one day and produced a long
despatch from 'Vashington contesting our claim to act as we were
doing in stopping contraband going to neutral ports. 'I a1n instructed,' be said, 'to read this despatch to you.' He read, and I
listened. He then said: 'I have now read the despatch, but I do
not agree with it; let us consider how it should be answered!' On
other occasions be would urge us to find means of a\oiding provocation of American feeling; for instance, he urged us to find some
way of acting other than by Orders in Council, which since 1812
had had such odious associations for the United States. He knew
that these were only a 1natter of form, and that there was nothing
in them intrinsically offensiT"e to the United States, but the name
was hateful in America. Unfortunately Orders in Council were
formalities essential to make our action legal in British Courts of
Law and we could not do without them." . (Grey of Fallodoa,
'.rwenty-fiye Years, vol. II, p. 160.)
'

Search at sea, 1915-16.-After the receipt of seYeral
notes assuring the United States that the measures taken
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by the Allied Governn1ents 'vould not unjustifiably infringe upon neutral rights, the American Secretary of
State sent to the An1erican Ambassador in Great Britain
a long co1nmunication on October 21, 1915, for presenta6on to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The note called attention to various vexatious interferences 'vith American co1runerce which the American Governinent had expected 'vould cease. Among the annoyanees 1nentioned 'vas delay of sh~pping 'vithout adequate
grounds of suspicion. This note states:
" ( 4) In regard to search at sea, an examination of the instructions issued to naval commanders of the United States, Great
Britain, Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and France from 1888 to
the beginning of the present war shows that search in port was
not contemplated by the Go"\"ernment of any of these countries.
On the contrary, the context of the respective instructions shows
that search at sea was the procedure expected to be followed by
the commanders. All of these instructions impress upon the naval
officers the necessity of acting with the utmost moderation-and
in some cases commanders are specifically instructed-in exercising the right of visit and search, to avoid undue deviation of the
vessel from her course.
" ( 5) An examination of the opinions of the most en1inen t text
writers on the laws of nations shows that they give practically no
consideration to the question of search in port, outside of examination in the course of regular prize-court proceedings.
"(6) The assertion by His nlajesty's Government that the position of the United States in relation to search at sea is inconsistent with its practice during the American Civil War is
based upon a misconception. Irregularities there may have been
at the beg~.nning of that war, but a careful search of the records
of this Government as to the practices of its commanders shows
conclusively that there were no instances when vessels were
brought into port for search prior to instituting prize court
proceedings, or that captures were made upon other grounds
than, in the words of the American note of November 7, 1914,
'evidence found on the ship under investigation and not upon
circumstances ascertained from external sources.' A copy of
the instruction issued to American naval officers on August 18,
1862, for their guidance during the Civil War, is appended.
"(7) The British contention that 'modern conditions' justify
bringing vessels into port for search is based upon the size and
seaworthiness of modern carriers of commerce and the difficulty
of uncovering the real transaction in the intricate trade operations of the present day. It is believed that conunercial transactions of the present time, han1pered as they are by censorship
of telegraph and postal communications on the part of belligerents, are essentially no more complex and disguised than in the
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war~ of recent years, during which the practice of obtaining
evidence in port to detennine whether a vessel should be held
for prize proceedings was not adopted. The effect of the size
and seaworthiness of Inerchant:l vessels upon their search at sea
has been submitted to a board of na Yal experts, which reports
that" 'At no period in history has it been considered necessary to
remoYe eYery package of a ship'" cargo to establish the character
:md nature of her trade or the serYice on which she is bound,
nor is such renwval necessary. * * *
'· 'The facilities for boarding and inspection of niodern ships
are in fact greater than in foriner tilnes : and no difference, so
far as the necessities of the case are concerned, can be seen
between the search of a ship of a thousand tons and one of
twenty-thousand tons-except possibly a difference in time-for
the purpose of establishing fully the character of her cargo and
the nature of her service and destination. * * * This
Inethod would be a direct aid to the belligerents concerned in
that it would release a belligerent vessel overhauling the neutral
from its duty of search and set it free for further belligerent
operations.' " * * *
"(12) The further contention that the greatly increased imports of neutral countries, adjoining Great Britain's enemies,
raise a presumption that certain coinn1odities, such as cotton,
rubber, and others more or less useful for military purposes,
though destined for those countries, are intended for reexportation to the belligerents who can not import them directly, and
that this fact justifies the detention for the purpose of examination of all Yessels bound for the ports of those neutral countries,
notwith~tanding the fact that Inost of the articles of trade haYe
been placed on the embargo li~ts of those countries, can not be
ac>cepted as laying down a just or legal rule of evidence. Such
a presumption is too remote from the facts and offers too great
opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, who could, if the rule
were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas
:1nd prey with impunity upon neutral commerce. To such a
rule of legal presumption this GoYernn1ent can not accede, as
it is opposed to those fundainental principles of justice which
are the foundation of the jurisprudence of the United States
and Great Britain." * * :;:
"(1G) In view of these considerations. the United States, r(~·
iterating its position in this matter, has no other course but to
contest seizures of Yessels at sea upon conjectural suspicion and
the practice of bringing them into port for the purpose, by search
or otherwise~ of obtaining evidence, for t be purpose of justifying
prize proceedings, of the carriage of contra band or of breaches
of the order in council of :l\Iarch 11. Relying upon the regard
of the British Govern1nent for the principles of j~tice so frequently and mliformly manifested prior to the present war, this
Government anticipates that the British Govern1nent will in~trnct their officers to refrain fr01n these vexations and illegal
practices.'' (Foreign Helations, U. S.. 1915, Supplement, pp.
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This \Yas the championship of neutrality note, of
" ·hich a paragraph at the end declares:
"This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights,
vdlich have received the sanction of the civilized world, against

the luwle8s conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness
of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of
Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the
accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising
alway8 that ilnpartiality which frmn the outbreak of the war
it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations." (Ibid., p. 580.)

At this time replies w·ere long delayed to such protests, and often conditions 'vere much changed before
replies 'vere received. The British Ambassador in the
United States transn1itted the reply to the note of
October 21, 1915, on April 24, 1916, after more than six
n1onths. This reply ga Ye extended consideration to the
1natter of visit and search sur place:
"5. When visit and search at sea are possible, and when a
search can be made there which is sufficient to secure belligerent
rights, it may be admitted that it would be an unreasonable
hardship on n1erchan t vessels to compel them to come into port,
and it may well be belieYed that 1naritime nations have hesitated to 1nodify the instructions to their naval officers that it is
nt sea that these operations should be carried out, and that
undue deviation of the Yessel from her course must be avoided.
That, however, does not affect the fact that it 'vould be ilnl10Ssible under the conditions of modern warfare to confine the
rights of Yisit and search to an examination of the ship at the
place where she is encountered without surrendering a fundaInental belligerent right.
"6. The effect of the size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea is essentially a technical question,
and accordingly His l\Iajesty's GoYernment have thought it well
to submit the report of the board of naval experts, quoted by the
United States Ambassador in paragraph 7 of this note, to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe for his observation. The unique experience which this officer has gained as the result of more than
18 months in com1nand of the Grand Fleet renders his opinion
of peculiar value. His report is as follows :
.
" 'It is undoubtedly the case that the size of 1nodern vessels i~
one of the factors which renders search at sea far more difficult
than in the days of smaller vessels. So far as I know, it has
never been contended that it is necessarr to remove every package
of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her
trade, etc.; but it must be obvious that the larger a vessel and
the greater the amount of cargo, the 1nore difficult does exan1-
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ination at sea become, because nwre packages nn1st be removetl.
" 'This diftlculty is 1nuch enhanced by the practice of concealing
contraband in bales of hay and passengers' luggage, casks, etc.,
and this procedure, which has undoubtedly been carried out, necessitates the actual removal of a good deal of cargo for exa1nination
in suspected cases. This re1noval cannot be carried out at sea,
except in the very finest weather.
'' 'Further, in a large ship the greater bulk of the cargo renders
it easier to conceal contraband, especially such valuable metals as
nickel, quantities of which can easily be stowed in places other
than the holds of a large ship.
"'I entirely dispute the contention, therefore, advanced in the
American note, that there is no difference between the search of
a ship of 1,000 tons and one of 20,000 tons. I an1 sure that the
fallacy of the statement n1ust be apparent to anyone who has ever
carried out such a search at sea.
" 'There are other facts, however, which render it necessary to
bring vessels into port for search. The most important is the
1nanner in which those in command of German submarines, in
entire disregard of international law and of their own prize regulations, attack and sink n1erchant vessels on the high seas, neutral
as well as British, without visiting the ship and therefore without
any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders it unsafe
for a neutral vessel which is being ~xa1nined by officers from a
British ship to remain stopped on the high seas, and it is therefore
in the interests of the neutrals themsel\es that the examination
should be conducted in port." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1916,
Supplement, p. 369.)

.A.:fter a statement in regard to abuse o:£ neutral rights
by Germany, the note continues:
''The French Ministry of :Marine shares the views expressed by
Sir J. Jellicoe on the question of search at sea, and has added the
following statement:
"'Naval practice, as it formerly existed, consisting in searching
ships on the high seas, a method handed down to us by the old
Navy, is no longer adaptable to the conditions of navigation of the
present day. A1nericans have anticipated its insufficienr~r and
have foreseen the necessity of substituting some n1ore effective
method. In the Instructions issued by the American Navy De·
partment, under date of .June 20, 1898, to the cruisers of the "Cnited
States, the following order is found (clause 13·) :
"'If the httter (the ship's papers) show contraband of war, the
ship should be seized; if not, she should be set free unless by
reason ·of strong grounds for suspici-an a further search should
semn to be requi-site.'
·

"'Every method Innst be 1nodified having regard to the nlOdifications of Inaterial which 1nen have at their disposal, on condition
that the method remains humane and civilised.
"'The French Admiralty considers that to-day a ship, in order
to be searched, should be brought to a port whenever the state of
the sea, the nature, weight, volume, and stowage of the suspect
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cargo, as well as the obscurity and lack of precision of the ship's
papers, render search at sea practically impossible or dangerous
for the ship searched.
" 'On the other hand, when the contrary circu1nstances exist, the
search should be 1nade at sea.
" 'Bringing the ship into port is also necessary and justified
when, the neutral vessel having entered the zone or vicinity of
hostilities, (1) it is a question, in the interests of the neutral ship
herself, of avoiding for the latter a series of stoppages and successive visits and of establishing once for all her innocent character
and of permitting her thus to continue her voyage freely and
without being molested; and (2) the belligerent, within his rights
of legitimate defence, is entitled to exercise special vigilance over
unknown ships which circulate in these waters.'
"The question of the locality of the search is, however, one of
secondary importance. In view of His :Majesty's Government the
right of a belligerent to intercept contraband on its way to his
enemy is fundamental and incontestable, and ought not to be
restricted to intercepting contraband which happens to be accompanied on board the ship by proof sufficient to condemn it. What
is essential is to determine whether or not the goods were on
their way to the enemy. If they were, a belligerent is entitled to
detain them. and having regard to the nature of the struggle in
which the Allies are engaged they are compelled to take the 1nost
effectual steps to exercise that right." (Ibid., p. 370.)

The practice of searching vessels in port continued.
Opinion of J. A.. Hall.-~1r. J. A. Hall, who, before
the World 1Var, published a book on the Law of Naval
Warfare, issued a second edition after the war and after
connection with the British Navy. The closing sentence
of his preface reads :
"Navies and armies have not ceased to be necessary with the
passing of the Great War, and so long as that is the case a knowledge of international law remains of special importance to the
Officers of that Service 'whereon, under the good providence of
God, the wealth, safety, and strength of the kingdom chiefly depend.'" (Law of Naval Warfare, 2d ed., p. vii.)

In discussing the right of visit and search and after he
has referred to divers~on for search in port, l\1r. Hall
says:
".Apart altogether fro1n the special circumstances of the Great
'Var arising ont of Ger1nany's illegal practices at sea, the following permanent reasons for this development of the right seem to
afford it full justification :
"1. The ship's papers in these days, when telegraphs and other
1neans of rapid communication are available for merchants, need
afford no reliable indication of the destination of the cargo.
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.. 2. The destination of the -vessel owing to railways and. other
modern n1eans of land transport is no criterion of the destination
of the cargo.
.
"3. The ship's officers 1nay be equally ignorant on this point.
"4. ~Iodern means of communication. while reducing the value
of evidence from the ship, has enormously increased the vowers of
a belligerent government to obtain inforn1ation from the vessel's
port of departure and pass on instructions to its exa1nining
cruisers.
"5. The size of modern 1nerchant ships enables them to keep at
~ea when weather conditions make even Yisiting rhem ilnpossible.
"G. The necessary extension of contraband to cover articles of
sn1all bulk but of great value for war, together with the huge
cargo capacity of modern ships, has n1ade concealment easy and
an adequate examination of such cargo at sea impossible."
(Ibid .. p. 20G.)

It is admitted that "~ar ''ill cause inconvenience to
neutral comn1erce, but that the right of visit nnd search
should not be abused.
"In .the first place the spot selected for search must not involYe
nn unreasonable deviation of the -vessel from ber voyage. In
the second place, it seems perfectly clear that nothing in international law can justify diversion 1nerely in the hope of discovering by subsequent search e\idence of contra band or other
noxious trading: there must be some substantial ground, no Inatter from what source it is deriYed, for suspecting that this particular \essel is engaged in such trade, although the evidence
1nay not at the moment be sufficient to support a plea for condemnation in the prize court." (Ibid .. p. 267.)

1Vational rules on dit·ersion.-The diversion of a lnerehant ship fron1 its course has long been restricted and
often specific rules \Yere issued.
1'he German Prize Ordinance of 1909 prescribed in
J"egard to neutral ships :
"Sl. ~rhe
~hip under
~earch ; he

captain must as 1nuch as possible a ,·oid diYerting a
a neutral flag frmn her course during the visit and
shall especially endeavor to canse the ship the least
possible inconvenience, especiall:v will he in no circumstances require the master to come on boa;d the '1nan-of-war. or that :1 boat,
men of the crew, the ship's papers. etc. be sent on board."
"85. If the weather make boarding impossible, the captain will
11r0~cribe a given course to the ship, in case he has serions suspicion of her and will follow himself, until it is possible to carry
out the visit."
"1 0. Should anything. for example, bad weather, pre,·ent a
hnar<lin~ party from being sent on board, a suspect ship is to be
hron~hf into port without further vrocedure.
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" Should it be necessary at the same time to declare such a
ship as captured, she 1nust be ordered to haul down her flag and
to follow the war vessel."
"11. It must be clearly stated in the Prize Report whether
the ship has been captured or merely brought into port for
r-:earch; in the latter case the reason must be given, for example,
whether search was impossible for military reasons or owing to
the nature of the cargo, weather, etc."
"91. If the making of the search is prove<l to be necessary, but
at the time is not practicable to carry out, the ship will be
searched later at a suitable place. If this causes serious disadYantages to the ship to be searched, the captain will proceed to
the provisional capture."

.

'l'he Japanese Regulations of 1904, in Article 51, said
briefly:
"In visiting or searching a Yessel the captain of tlH-: man-of\Yar shall take care not to divert her from her original course
Jnore than necessary and as far as possible not to give her inconYenience.''

Case of the Joseph lV. Fordney.-There were n1any
cases of detention on grounds of doubtful legality during
the \Vorld War, 1914-18.
Protests by the GoYern1nent of the United States ""\Vere
1net by delays and by correspondence often confusing the
jssues. The delays and excuses in the case of the steamer
Joseph lV. Fordney led the American Secretary of State
after long correspondence to say in a letter to the An1erican An1bassador in Great Britain on November 3, 1915:
"The note addressed to you by Foreign Office under date October 6, 1915, confirms Departn1ent's original supposition seizure
cargo steamer Joseph 1V. Fordney was an illegal act on part
British authorities since goods were seized on suspicion and without probable cause. These goods were subject to seizure only if
eonsigned to Gennan GoYernment or its armed forces. Department observes Foreign Office states that, as His l\tlajesty~s GovernJnen t 'now' have reason to believe that the goods 'were for the
ene1ny Government or its armed forces, proceedings for condemnation are being taken on that ground.' In other words, it appears
that approximately one half year after seizure goods British
authorities believe they have such evidence as alone would have
justified seizure this cargo. Department does not perceive the pertinency to matter under discussion of statement to you by Foreign
Office pointing out that when it was arranged that you should be
informed regarding detention of ships, with an indication of the
grounds of detention, it was emphasized that this undertaking
would not be understood a s debarring British Government from
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raising additional grounds for proceeding against a cargo or ship
in prize court. If adequate evidence warranting seizure goods was
not disclosed by due examination of Yessel at time of its seizure,
there of course could be no lawful seizure of the cargo and, therefore, no subsequent lawful prize court proceedings.
"Communicate with Foreign Office in sense foregoing, and since
it would appear from British Government's own statement cargo
was illegally seized, you may renew your request for its release."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1915, Supplement, p. 608.)

.t\.fter further correspondence and delays on April 13,
1916, the Secretary of State sent another dispatch to the
A1nerican Ambassador:
''Representatives Atlantic Export Company, shippers of cargo
on steamer Joseph W. Fordney, inform Department they haYe
been advised by English lawyers that new order in council, ~larch
30 last, regarding conditional contraband is construed by British
authorities as retroactive and will be applied to cargo of this vessel and in other American cases set for early trial. These representatives state that proceedings of this character would amount
to denial justice in the case of this cargo. Department agrees
with views of shippers as to unwarranted character these proceedings. Department has made known to British Government
through you its views that if proper examination warranting the
seizure of goods in question was not disclosed by proper examination of vessel at the time its seizure, there could be no lawful
seizure of the cargo and, therefore, no subsequent lawful prize
court proceedings, and that seizure of a vessel and cargo can not
be justified on the strength of evidence of illegal destination cargo
discovered, as appears according to the British Government's
statement to have been the case with reference to steamer Joseph
lV. Fordney, approximately one-half year after seizure took place.
No reply justifying such a course has been made by Britisll
GoYernmen t.
''Communicate with Foreign Office in sense foregoing and say
that this GoYernment considers it is entitled to receive statement
from British Government regarding their views as to how such
evidence can warrant a seizure of this ldnd and prize court proceedings in relation thereto." (Ibid., p. 363.)

Not until Niay 9, 1916, did the Ambassador inform the
Secretary of State that the Foreign Office stated that "the
British Government must decline to enter into any discussion of points which are awaiting decision in a case pending in the prize court.''
A long note from Sir Ed,vard Grey was transmitted to
the Secretary of State on April 24, 1916, in which the
actions complained of by the United States 'Yere discussed
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and the course pursued by British authorities was
defended.
The cargo of the Joseph lV. Fordney~ "10 1nillion
pounds of feed and cake" recognized as conditional contraband consigned to a neutral country \Vas conden1ned
as good and la,vful prize.
Resistance.-As visit and search in time of \Var is generally regarded as the exercise of a legitimate \Yar right,
resistance to visit and search makes the n1erchant vessel
liable to consequences. Naval regulations relating to
resistance vary. An attempt to escape, as by flight or
under cover of darkness, does not justify conde1nnation,
but does render the ship suspect and liable to capture
and bringing into port. Such force may be used as is
necessary to bring the merchant vessel to, and this
usually consists in firing a shot in advance of the vessel
and across the bow. Forcible resistance 1nakes the vessel
liable to condemnation. The German Prize Code, 1916,
Article 5, stated :
"Care is to be taken in determining whether an attempt has
been made to escape.
"The commanding officer must :
"(1) Make certain that the signals have been understood, especially if there is another ship in the vicinity. •
"(2) In the case of merchant ships, any increase in speed is
generally small, and barely distinguishable from any great distance, as they in any case usually stea1n at full speed.
" ( 3) Some companies have ordered their ships, in the event of
their being held up, not to reverse the engines, but simply to stop
and allow the ship to proceed until she has lost her way." (1925
Naval 'Var College. International Law Documents, p. 44.)

In the German Prize Ordinance, September 30; 1909,
it \vas explained that"An attempt to escape renders the ship suspect and therefore
. justifies her being captured and brought into port without further procedure. If, however, the ship is not liable to confiscation on other ground-for example, on account of carrying contraband or rendering assistance contrary to the laws of neutralityshe may no~ be sunk, nor, if it is impossible to bring her into
port, may any other disadvantages be imposed upon her by way
of punishment." (Ibid., p. 44.)
1820-37--5
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'fhe unratified Declaration of London, 1909, \Yas considered as reflecting the general opinion on the la \V at
that period. .Article 63 of the Declaration of London
states:
"}.,orcible resistance to the legitilnate exercise of the right of
stoppage, visit and search, and capture, involves in all cases the
condemnation of the vessel. The cargo is liable to the same
treatment which the cargo of an enemy vessel would undergo.
Goods belonging to the master or owner of the vessel are regarded as enemy goods." (1909 Naval 'Var College, International Law Topics, p. 145.)

1\. provision to the above effect \Yas in 1nany national
rules in 1914.
The Spanish Instructions of 1898, after referring to
hoisting the flag and firing a blank shot, sho\V a considerate attitude to,vard the n1erchant Yessel:
"If the n1erchant vessel does not obey this first inthnation,
and either refuses to hoist her flag or does not lay to, a second
gun will be fired, this time loaded, care being taken that the
shot does not strike the vessel, though going sufficiently close
to her bows for the vessel to be duly warned; and if this second
intimation be disregarded, a third shot will be fired at the vessel,
so as to damage her, if possible, without sinking her. 'Vhatever be the da1nage caused to the merchant vessel by this third
shot, the commanding officer of the man-of-war or captain of
the prh·a teer can not be made responsible.
''Nevertheless, in view of special circumstances, and in proportion to the suspicion excited by the merchantman, the auxiliary vessel of war or privateer may delay resorting to the last
extremity until some other measure has been taken, such as not
aiming the third discharge at the vessel, but approaching it and
making a fresh notification by word of Inouth; but if this last
conciliatory measure prove fruitless, force will immediately be
resorted to." (Article 4, b.)

Resista;noe and armed merchant ves8els of belligerents.-Before the days of steam navigation, merchant
vessels w·ere usually equipped for defense against pirates,
8ea robbers, privateers, and often against the more lightly
armed vessels of war. vVith the introduction of modern ·
armored and armed Yessels of \Var, there \Yas little reason
for arming merchant vessels. The Declaration of Paris,
1856, that "PriYateering is and ren1ains abolished", re-
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1noYed one of the reasons forn1erly adYanced to support
ar1ning of 1nerchant vessels, but the clain1 to the right to
convert fast stea1n Yessels into vessels of war under
government control soon follo,ved. The Hague Conference of 1907 1nacle an effort to regularize such conversion
by conventional agree1nent, but son1e of the 1nost in1porl ant co1nn1ercial states did not ratify the convention.
The conditions of World War, 1914-18, led, ho,vever,
to the arn1ing of 1~any vessels ordinarily classed as merchant Yessels. There then arose the controversy as to the
distinction bet,Yeen an unarmed merchant vessel and one
ar1necl for defense. Attempts to define 'Yhat 1night constitute arn1a1nent for defense met "-ith indifferent success. The distinction bet"-een defensi Ye and offensive
action at the tin1e of approach for Yisit and search would
usually rest upon the intention of the n1aster of the
ar1ned merchant vessel 'vhich would not be proYable, and
a test to which the Yisiting vessel of 'Yar 'Yould scarcely
care to submit.
7
• E. Hall, 'Yhose treatise on International Law· 'vas
a standard in England from the latter half of the nineteenth century, said :

v,

"The right of capture on the ground of resistance fo yisit, and
t hat of subsequent confiscation, flow necessarily from the lawfulness of Yisit, and give rise to no question. If the belligerent when
visiting is within the rights possessed by a state in amity with
t he country to which the neutral ship belongs, the neutral master
is guilty of an unprovoked aggression in using force to prevent
t he visit frmn being accomplished, and the belligerent may consequently treat him as an enemy and confiscate his ship.
"The only point arising out of this cause of seizure which
r equires to be noticed is the effect of resistance upon cargo when
made by the master of the Yessel, or upon Yessel and cargo together when 1nade by the officer commanding a convoy. The
English and American courts, which alone see In to have had an
opportunity of deciding in the matter, are agreed in looking upon
the resistance of a neutral master as involving goods in the fate
of the vessel in which they are loaded, and of an officer in charge
a s condemning the whole property placed under his protection.
'I stand with confidence', said Lord Stowell, 'upon all fair principles of reason, upon the distinct authority of Vattel, upon the
institutes of other great maritime countries, as well as those of
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our own country, when I venture to lay it down, that by the law
of nations as now understood a deliberate and continued resistance to search, on the part of a neutral Yessel, to a lawful cruiser,
is followed by the legal consequences of confiscation.' " ([The
:Maria (179D) 1 C. Rob. 369.] Hall, International Law, Higgins.
Sth ed., p. 891.)

Holland's opinion, L905.-Sir Tho1nas Erskine Holland, late professor of international la'v at Oxford University and responsible for the Admiralty Manual o:f
Prize La'v of 1888, gave a summary of his opinion upon
the sinking of neutral prizes ~n a letter to the London
Tin1es, June 29, 1905:
"1. There is no established rule of international law which
nbsolutely forbids, under any circumstances, the sinking of a
neutral prize. A consensus gentiunt to this effect will hardly be
alJeged by those who are aware that such sinking is permitted by
the most recent prize regulations of France, Russia, Japan, and
the United States.
"2. It is much to be desired that the practise should be, by
future international agreement, absolutely forbidden-that the
lenity of British practice in this respect should become intereationally obligatory.
"3. In the Ineantime, to adopt the language of French instructions, 'On ne doit user de ce droit de destruction qu'avec plus la
grande reserYe'; and it may well be that any given set of instructions (e. g. the Russian) leaves on this point so large a discretion to cmnmanders of cruisers as to constitute an intolerable
grievance.
"4. In any case, the owner of neutral property, not proved to be
good prize, is entitled to the fullest compensation for his loss. In
the language of Lord Stowell :
" 'The destruction of the property may ha Ye been a n1eritorious
act towards his own Govern1neut; but still the person to whom the
property belongs must not be a sufferer . . . if the captor bas by
the act of destruction conferred a benefit upon the public, he must
look to his own Government for his indemnity.'" (Holland,
Letters on 'Var and Neutrality, 3d ed., 179.)

A m/erican attitude, 1916.-vVhen relations "~ere
strained bet"~een the United States and Gern1any in
early 1916 questions 'vere raised in regard to visit and
search. In a com1nunication from the Secretary of State
to the American A1nbassador in Germany, April 28,
1D16, it 'vas said:
"If Secretary Yon Jagow asks you as to the niethods of warfare
which this Government considers to be legal, you may hand to
him a memoranclun1 reading as follows:

A~IERICAN

ATTITUDE, 1916

61

'· ':\le1norandum on Conduct of Naval Yessels toward :\lerchant
Ships.
" '1. A belligerent warship can directly attack if a merchant
vessel resists or continues to flee after a summons to surrender.
" '2. An attacking vessel must display its colors before exercising belligerent rights.
'' '3. If a merchant vessel surrenders, the attack n1ust immediately cease and the rule as to visit and search must be
applied" ' (a) by a visit to the vessel by an officer and ~r..en of the
attacking ship; or
" '(b) by a visit to the attacking ship by an officer of the
vessel attacked, with the ship's papers.
" '4. An attacking vessel n1ust disclose its identity and name of
con1mander when exercising visit and search.
" '5. If visit and search disclose that the vessel is of belligerent
nationality, the vessel may be sunk only if it is impossible to
take it into port, p1·ovided that the persons on board are put in
a place of safety and loss of neutral property is indemnified.
"'NoTE: (a) A place of safety is not an open boat out of sight
of land.
" '(b) A place of safety is not an open boat, if the 'vind is
strong, the sea rough, or the weather thick, or if it is \ery cold.
"' (c) A place of safety is not an open boat which is overcrowded or is small or unseaworthy or insufficiently 1nanned.
"'6. If, however, visit and search disclose that the vessel is of
neutral nationality, it must not be sunk in any circumstances,
except of gravest importance to the captor's state, and then only
in accordance with the above provisos and notes.'
''You tnay further state that this Govennnent is unwilling and
can not consent to have the illegal conduct of Gern1any's enemies
toward neutrals on the hi&"h seas ~ade a subject of discussion in
connection with the abandonment of illegal n1ethods of submarine warfare." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1016 Supplement,
p. 252.)

Atte1npt to escape.-The atte1npt of an enemy merchant vessel to escape Yisit and search is natural and
lawful, and well established rules exist to protect the
1nerchant vessel in the exercise of the effort to escape.
Even ''hen atten1pting to escape the 1nerchant vessel has
from the eighteenth century been entitled to considerate
treatn1ent and is not liable to penalty 1nerely because of
the atte1npt. Signals must be given to bring the Inerchant Yessel to. The \Yarning gun across the bo'v was
commonly required, and the vessel of ''ar 'vas required
to hoist its true colors before firing a gun in action. In
order that no undue risk may be incurred by the 1ner-
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chant vessel, the visiting personnel \Yas li1nited in nunlber and ar1ns. The 1naster of the. Yisited Yessel or his
representative should not be required to con1e on board
an)T visiting vessel to sho\Y his papers or for any other
purpose, though on board he may be required to sho"r
his papers or open receptacles or hatches for investigation. If the n1aster refuses to furnish infor1nation or
declines to sho'' essential papers, this may be considered
a gronnd of suspicion justifying bringing the ship before a prize court. Even an ene1ny 1nerchant yessel 1nay
have on board neutral.persons and property entitled to
consideration under the la\v. It has been said of visit
and search that, ".AJl that was necessary to this object
\Yas la ,yful: all that transcends it \Yas nnla \Yfn l. ~' (The
Anna 11/aria [1817], 2 'Vheaton 327.)
Article 22, London Naval Treaty, 1930.-The Articles
of the London Kaval Treaty of l!J30 \Yere in general to
ren1ain in force till Dece1nber 31, 1936~ but part l,i,
Article 22, \Yns to ;'re1nain in force \Yithout li1nit of
time.~~ This rrrticle provides :
"ARTICLE 22. The following are accepted as established rules of
International Law:
•
"(1) In their nction with regard to merchant ships, submarines
must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface
vessels are subject.
"(2) In pnrticnlnr, except in the case of persistent refusal to .
stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or
senrch, a warship, whether surface vessel or submnrine, may not
sink or rPnder incnpable of navigation a merchant yessel without
haYing first placed va.ssengers, crew and ship's paper in a place
of snfet:,~. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a
plnce of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is
assurPd, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proxinlity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position
to take them on board.
"The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to
express their assent to the above rules." (1930 Naval War
College. International Law Situations, p. 159; 46 Stat. (Pt. II),
2858.)

··nrhile it n1ight have been preferable to have an article
"·hich \Vould have limited its provisions to the statement
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of the first paragraph, merely requiring submarines to
conform to the rules for surface vessels, the statement
does not necessarily extend by analogy to aircraft.
The general principles of visit and search 'vould, hawever, be unchanged, even though a ne'v instrumentality
might be introduc~d. The summoning, bringing to,
boarding, inspection of papers, search in certain cases,
taking in, and bringing before a prize court was the
general procedure, though in certain case·s so1ne of these
steps might be omitted.· A surface vessel under modern
conditions might consider it expedient to escort a vessel
to port for search by port authorities, on1itting other
procedure. The state of the escorting vessel in such a
case assumes all liability for the action if it proves ungrounded, and in any case the service of the escorting
vessel has been for the tin1e lost to its forces. The seized
vessel cannot complain that the belligerent making the
seizure has not acted in good faith and sho,vn adequate
evidence of suspicion. The placing of a prize crew on
board is analagous as an evidence of intent to make a
bona fide seizure.
The mere ordering into port for search is a practice
of a different character and liable to grave abuses.
Discussion, The Hague, 1923.-At The Hague in 1923
the Commission of Jurists did not find it easy to agree
upon rules tor visit and search, and the Netherlands
Delegation 1nade reservations upon the rules as formulated. This delegation regarded aircraft as a new· engine
of \Var unlike a vessel of 'var and unable to exercise a
similar control over a merchant vessel and uncertain as
to its control over private aircraft. No article upon the
exercise of visit and search of merchant vessels by aircraft received a majority vote of the delegations. The
United States, British Empire, France, Italy~ Japan, and
the Netherlands 'vere represented. ...t\. 1najority of the
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delegations did not feel able to support the principle
e1nbodied in :~rticle 49 of the Report of the Con1mission
to the follo"·ing effect:
,..PriYate aircraft are liable to visit and search and to capture
by belligerent military aircraft."

.A..ll agreed that such an article should be carefully
guarded in order to avoid abuse. It ·was evident that
visit and search sur place 'vould often be i1npossible by
aircraft of any type in use in 1923, and 'vould be possible only under very favorable conditions. It 'vas
agreed that to permit an aircraft to compel a n1erchant
vessel to con1e to a conYenient place for visit and search
would i1npose much inconvenience and heavy losses on the
vessel, and that such an act on the part of a belligerent
surface. Yessel of 'var ""'a.s of doubtful validity.
"The French Delegation proposed the following text:
"Aircraft are forbid.den to operate a~ainst 1uerchant vessels,
whether surface or submarine, without conforming to the rules
to which surface warships are subject." (19~-J. Naval 'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 13S.)

The discussion which is summarized in the General
Report of the Commission of Jurists, February 19, 1923,
is of such significance that it is presented somewhat
fully.
TTis it and search by aircraft.-The preliminary drafts
of a code for aerial 'varfare before the Commission of
Jurists upon the revision of the rules of warfare at The
Hague, 1922-23~ ·were those of the United States and
Great Britain. The connnission "·orked on the basis of
a draft subn1itted by the r\..Inerican Delegation, and the
American and British drafts provided for the use of aircraft in Yisit and search. Some of the other states "·ere
opposed. The Netherlands Delegation felt:
'(that the custom and practice of international law is limited to a
right on the part of belligerent warships to capture after certain
formalities merchant vessels employed in the carriage of such
l'Ommerce. No justification exists for the extension of those
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rights to an aircraft, which is a ne'v engine of war entirely different in character from a warship and unable to exercise over
merchant vessels or private aircraft a control similar to that exercised by a warship over merchant vessels. Consequently there
is no reason to confer on a military aircraft the right to make
captures as if it were a warship, and no reason to subject commerce to capture when carried in an aircraft. In developing international law the tendency should be in the direction of conferring greater, not less, immunity on private property." (1924
Naval War College, International Law Documents, p. 137.)

'fhe majority of delegations, however, did not oppose
visit and search and capture of private aircraft by belligerent military aircraft, but a majority of votes w·as
not secured upon an article extending to belligerent
1nilitary aircraft the right of visit and search of merchant vessels and 'vide divergence of Yiew was expressed, and in the report it was stated that :
"The aircraft in use to-day are light and fragile things. Except in favourable circumstances they would not be able to alight
on the water and send a man on board a merchant vessel at the
spot where the merchant vessel is first encountered ( 1.:isite sur
place). To make the right of visit and search by an aircraft
('ffective it would usually be necessary to direr:t the merchant
vessel to come to some convenient locality where the aircrait can
alight and send men on board for the purpose. This would imply
a right on the part of the belligerent military aircraft to compel
the merchant vessel to deviate from her course before it was in
vossession of any proof derived from an examination of the ship
herself and her papers that there were circun1stances of suspicion
which justified such interference with neutral trade. If the
deviation which the merchant vessel was obliged to 1nake was prolonged, as might be the case if the aircraft was operating far from
land, the losses and inconvenience imposed on neutral shipping
would be very heavy.
"Is or is not a warship entitled to oblige a merchant vessel to
deviate from her course for the purpose of enabling the right of
visit and search to be carried out? Would an aircraft be exercising its rights in conform!ty with the rules to which surface
warships are subject if it obliged a merchant Yessels to deviate
from her course in this way? Even if a warship is entitled on
occasion to oblige a merchant vessel to deviate from her course
before visiting her, can a similar right be recognised for Inilitary
aircraft without opening the door to very great abuses?" (Ibid.,
- p. 137.)

Prohibition o£ the use o£ aircraft against merchant
v-essels except under the rules applicable to surface ves-
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sels of "·ar "·as the principle supporte<.l by the 1najority
in 1924.
'fhe Report of the Conunission of Jurists sho"·s the
atten1pts n1ade in 1924 to reach an agreement.
"The American Delegation, therefore, proposed the following
text:
" 'Aircraft are forbidden to Yisit and search surface or subsurface vessels without conforming in all respects to the rules
to which surface vessels authorized to conduct visit and search
are subject.
" 'In view of the irregularities to which the use of aircraft
against merchant vessels might give· rise, it is declared that aircraft cannot divert a merchant vessel frmn its course without
first boarding it; that in no event may an aircraft destroy a
merchant vessel unless the crew and passengers of such vessel
have first been placed in safety; and that if an aircraft cannot
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rul.es it 1nust
desist fron~ attack and from seizure and permit such vessel to
proceed unmolested.'" (Ibid, p. 139.)

The British Delegation, maintaining the analogy to
the submarine, proposed the language of the unratified
Washington Treaty of February 6, 1922, substituting,
except in the phrasing of the preliminary cause, the 'vord
''air<!raff' for "submarine", as follo,vs:
"The use of aircraft against 1nerchant vessels must be regulated by the following provisions, which, being in conformity
with the rules adopted by ciYilised nations for the protection of
the lives of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war,
are to be deemed an established part of international law:
"A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and
search to determine its character before it can be seized.
"A Inerchant vessel 1nust not be attacked unless it refuses to
submit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed
after seizure.
"A Inerchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and
passengers have first been placed in safety.
"Belligerent aircraft are not under any circu1nstances exempt
from the universal rules above stated; and if an aircraft cannot
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, the
existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed
unmolested." {Ibid., p. 139.)
•

The Japanese Delegation saw practical difficulties and
dangers in this procedure, but at length expressed readiness to accede to the American proposal.
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'l'he Italian Delegation suggested the addition of the
follo,-ring to the British proposal:
"After the first paragraph add" 'Visit must in general be carried out where the 1nerchant
Yessel is first encountered. Neyertheless, in cases where it may
be ilnpossible to alight and there is at the same tin1e good ground
fQr suspicion, the aircraft may order the 1nerchant vessel to
deYiate to a suitable locality, reasonably accessible, where she
1nay be visited. If no good cause for this action is shown, the
belligerent State must pay compensation for the loss caused by
the order to deviate.'
"After the third paragraph add:_
" 'If the 1nercbant yessel is in the territorial waters of the
enemy State an<l not on the high seas, she may be .destroyed
after previous notice has been given to the persons on board to
put themselyes in a place of safety and reasonable time has been
giYen them for so doing.''' (Ibid., p. 140.)

The Italian Delegation also maintained that a n1ajority of the European Po,vers admitted that a merchant
Yessel n1ight be obliged to deviate to a suitable port
"~here visit n1ight take place.
The Netherlands delegation accepted the A1nerican
proposal.
"When put to the Yote the American proposal was supported by
the Japanese and Netherlands Delegations and opposed by the
Bri tisb, French and I tali an. The French proposal was opposed
by the American, British, Japanese and Netherlands Delegation.
'l'he British and Italian Delegations explained that they could only
support it if it was amplified in the way indicated in the British
and Italian amendments ..
"Although all the Delegations concurred in the expression of a
desire to adopt such rules as would assure the observance of the
dictates of humanity as regards the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants, the Commission, by reason of a divergence of Yiews as to the method by which this result would best
be attained, was unable to agree upon an article dealing with the
exercise of belligerent rights by aircraft against 1nercbant vessels.
The code of rules proposed by the Commission therefore lea Yes the
matter open for future regulation." (Ibid., p. 141.)

Mr. Spaight on aircraft operations against merchant
vessels.-~1r. J. M. Spaight, 'vho has given much attention in Great Britain to the aspects of aviation as a factor
in " . ar, has a chapter on the operation of aircraft against
merchant Yessels in his book upon "Air Po". er and War
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Rights." Alnong the questions he raises is "·hether aircraft have the right to Yisit and search, and to capture
merchant vessels. This question beca1ne a practical one
during the 'Vorld ''Tar, 1914-18, and ~Ir. Spaight says:
"Unquestionabl~? the visit or boarding of a n1arine craft by an
aircraft is technically not impossible."

He also cites instances of acts inYolving the exercise of
visit and search and capture:
"In the Aeroplane of 4 July, 1917, there will be seen a photograph of a German seaplane floating beside a submarine and a
German officer or man standing on one of the seaplane's floats and
handing a document to the commander of the submarine. Here,
then, was a clear case of visit. It was unofficially reported fro In
Rotterdam on 23 July! 1917, that the Dutch steamer "Gelderland"
was stopped by three German seaplanes off the Hook of Holland.
and that a German officer went on board and forced the ship to
proceed to Zeebrugge. It has been placed on record by Naval
Capt. Hollender that the German airship L. 40, after landing on
the water, examined a ship's papers, and that the L. 23 surpassed
this feat by not only sending a party (in the ship's boats) to
inspect the cargo of a Kofwegian three-masted sailing ship, but put
a prize crew of three on board the vessel, which was then safely
brought into a Gennan port, after a voyage of 43 hours in the
North Sea." (2d edition, p. 471.)

1Ir. Spaight, "·hile achnitting that such Yisit and search
1nay haYe been exceptional during the 'Vorld ''Tar, foresees that W"ith changed conditions the exception 1nay in a
n1odified forn1 beco1ne the rule.
Judge lJfoore on Hague Oonunission, 1922-93.-Judge
John Bassett )Ioore, of the American Com1nission of
Jurists 1neeting at The Hague in 1922-2:3 and dra\Ying
up rules for the control of radio in ti1ne of \Yar and rules
of aerial "\varfare, \Yas elected President of the Con11nission. He said of the rules subn1itted in the General
Report of the Con11nission 1nade on February 19, 1923:
"Among the numerous and varied questions with which the
Cmnmission undertook to deal, the only one for the regulation of
which it was unable to agree upon a rule was that of visit and
search of merchant vessels by aircraft. Proposals on the subject
were presented by the British as well as by the American delegation; but the American delegation, in the light of what the discussions developed, soon l>eeame convinced that both proposals were

JUDGE

~IOORE'S

CO:Jll\lE)\T

69

defectiYe, and that. \Yithout stricter and more specific regulation
and control, aircraft n1ight inflict on life and property at sea
calamities fully as startling as those that had resulted in the
recent \Yar from the employment of submarines. * * *
''As regards the second topic-the Yisit and search of surface
~hips-the report, after describing the normal practice of
cruisers, including the sending of an officer aboard in order to
a ~certain whether there is cause for capture, and the sending
of a prize crew aboard if a case for capture is established, found
that, if aircraft obser\ed regular methods, they could exercise
Yisit and search 'only under favorable conditions,' but that, if
'the right of di\erting merchant vessels, without boarding them,'
"·ere 'legally established', aircraft could exercise it 'up to the
lilnit of their range of action from their land or floating base.'
Such range of action n1ay fairly be considered as extending to
a distance of at least two hundred-and-fifty miles. ..As regarded
the right under certain conditions to sink a prize after due proYision bas been 1nade for the safety of the crew. the report, while
not intimating that such proYision could ordinarily be made by
the aircraft itself, stated that 'in favorable weather, and when
it is easy to rerrcb a friendly or neutral port, a crew may be
compelled to abandon their ship and the ship may be fired upon
and sunk by the aircraft.' '.rhe conten1plation of aircraft thus
ranging the seas and issuing to unvisited and unsearched vessels
c.,rders enforcible by bombing the ship or by firing upon the
persons aboard, can scarcely be indulged without grave apprehensions. It was the possibilities thus suggested that led l\fr.
Struycken. first delegate from The Netherlands, to declare, both
in subcommittee and in plenary session, that such a method
of warfare might readily mean the terrorizing of the seas."
* * *
"Had the American delegation, in Yiew of the divergence of
opinions as to the right, or the extent of the right, even of
surface craft to deYiate Inerchantmen without search, been willing to concur in a n1ere enunciation of the princivle that aircraft should have, as regarded the exercise of -risit and search,
the same rights as surface Yessels. without attempting to say
what those rights were, a majority Yote n1ight have been obtained for such a resolution. This would hnTe been a compromise, and compromise is said to be of the e~sence of statesInanship. But there are two kinds of compromise. One kind
is that in ·which there is a meeting of minds, resulting in an
agreement. This is a wholesome and salutary process. The
0ther kind is that in which there is no meeting of n1inds, but
the diYergence is Yeneered with a deft formula, cloaking a disagreement. This process is but a breeder of future quarrels."
( l\ioore, International La\Y and Some Current Illusions, pp. 202.
204.)

Aircraft and deviation..-Froin their nature and
physical limitations, aircraft n1ight act as agents for
deviation when they 1night not haYe the personnel or
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other requisites essential for 1naking a captui·e in the
manner prescribed for surface vessels of 'Yar. If notification, "~ith instructions to proceed to a na1ned port
only, is all that is necessary to constitute capture, it
'vould be easy for an aircraft equipped with radio to
make a large number of captures of this nature. J. nl.
Spaight, of Great Britain, writing fron1 the point of
view of the operations of a stronger sea po"~er, said in
1926:
"DeYiation is likely to become the rule, not the exception. in
future. Yisit and search at sea by aircraft will always probably
be difficult. The ransacking of a liner will certainly be a practical impossibility. E'en if visit sur place is declared obligatory.
it is unlikely to be anything but perfunctory. But most probably
there will be no visit at all. Ships will be ordered to named
ports and if they take the risk of disobeying the order and
persist in disobeying it, they will be attacked and perhaps sunk.
The conditions of 1915-18 may be reproduced in an aggravated
form.
"The position of neutral commerce will indeed be wellnigh intolerable. I~reedmn of the sea will be dead and gone. Neutral
shipping will be policed and dragooned as it ne\er has been
before. It was scourged with whips in 1914-18; it will be
scourged with scorpions in a future war. Because the complete
interruption of all neutral trade beneficial to the ene1ny will
be more important than ever, because the grip on that trade will
be tighter than ever and e\asion more difficult, the conflict of
belligerent and neutral interests will be sharper, the consequent
disputes n1ore bitter, and the danger of actual war ·with neutral
States greater than in the past." (Aircraft and Commerce in
'Var, p. 52.)

Understood summons.-The consequences of visit and
search are so important that there should be no doubt
that the summons is understood and the visiting Yessel
should especially guard against extreme action until convinced that an appearance of disregard of a signal is not
misleading.
The Japanese Instructions of 1916, after proYiding day
and night signals, stated:
"3. In the event of the merchant ship disregarding the orders '
given under the preceding two clauses, it may be fired on by the
warship.
"4. For the time being, if it is found that the meaning of the
signals abo\e mentioned is not understood, His Imperial l\fajesty's
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ships will communicate with merchant ships in the international
code of signals. The procedure hitherto followed in other respects
ren1ains unchanged.''

The Instructions for the Navy of the United States
Governing Maritime vVarfare, 1917, stated:
44. Subject to any special treaty provisions the following procedure is directed: Before stnnmoning a vessel to lie to, a ship of
war must hoist her own national flag. The sun1mons shall be
made by firing a blank charge (coup de semonce), by other international signal, or by both. The summoned vessel, if a neutral,
is bound to stop and lie to, and she should also display her colors ;
if an enemy vessel, she is not so bound, and 1nay legally even
resist by force, but she thereby assumes all risks of resulting
damage.
''45. If the summoned vessel resists or takes to flight she may
be pursued and brought to, by forcible measures, if necessary."

Treaties often made Yery particular proYisions as to
the method which the whole conduct of the visit and
search should follow. Each vessel was entitled to kno''
the identity of the other and measures necessary to this
end were essential. The summoning gun was the method
of attracting attention before the use of radio became
common. If another method equally effectiYe 'vith the
summoning gun is available, that method 1nay be used.
It is essential that the summons, by ''hatever means, be
understood, and it is admitted that there may be n1any
causes ''hich might make summons by radio ineffective.
':Proceed as directed."-In the unratified treaty of the
Washington Conference of 1921 on the "Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare"~ Article I, there
was the following:
"A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and
search to determine its character before it can be seized.
"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to
submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed
after seizure." (1921 Naval War College, International Law
Documents, p. 330.)

The words of this paragraph were discussed as regards
submarines at the Naval War College. (1926 Naval 'Var
College, International Law Situations~ pp. 42, et .seq.).
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In 1926 it was stated that as to subn1arines-"there would
be son1e doubt as to the n1eaning of the "~ords 'to proceed
as directed after seizure.' " Tliere was also uncertainty
as to the significance of the "~ords "capture~' and "seizure"
used in Article I.
The late Adn1iral Harry S. l(na pp, U. S. K., in 1924,
published an article in "~hich he predicted that this conYention, if adopted, "~ould be a regrettable restriction
upon any atte1npt to formulate the la,,s of 'var.
The failure of this treaty to receiYe approYal of the
signatory powers left many questions open, and a part
of these caine before the London X a Yal Conference of
1930 .
.linzerican ah'Cl'aft o~ver 1.llea:ico, 1919.-...::\.nlerican
troops in 1919 crossed the l\iexican frontier, the An1er1can Goi.~erinnent affir1ning on ~c\...ngust 26 that it cou]<l
not
"be expected to suffer the indefinite continuance of existin;;
lawless conditions along its border which expose its citizens to
maltreat1nent at the hands of ruffianly elements of the :\lexican
population which their GoYernment seems unable to control, and
which haYe undoubtedly been encouraged to continue their act_:s
of aggression against citizens of the United States by reason
of the immunity fr01n punish1nent for such acts which they have
enjoyed.
'·~o Yiolation of the national so\ereignty of ~lexico was intended by this expedition. It was despatched upon the hot tr~il
of the bandits in question with the sole object of punishing
them for their Inistreatment of officers of the American .Army,
and of pre\enting future acti"lities of a similar nature upon our
frontier. This object, haYing been accmnplished as far as was
possible in the circumstances, orders haYe been issued for !"he
return of the troops to A1nerican territory" ( ForPign Relatim1s,
U. S., 1919, \Ol. II. p. 560).
.

A fe,, days later the l\fexican . .•\.1nbassador, on Septeinber 1~ con1n1unicated to the Secretary of State that"It has been reported to my Go\ernment during the afternoon
of the 28th of August, 1919, two aeroplanes of the United States
"?hich can1e from and afterward returned in the direction of
Ojinaga flew OYer the city of Chihuahua and although this is the
first time that U. S. aeroplanes flew oYer that city, they are
known. to cross the boundary line of the hYo Republics daily.
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"And, in corc.pliance with instructions received from n1y Government, I have the honor to bring the foregoing to Your Excellency's knowledge and to ask that you kindly use your good
offices in having the facts complained of duly investigated in
order that those found guilty be punished and repetition of
violations like those above stated be prevented.
"I duly thank Your Excellency [etc.]
(Ibid., p. 561.)

On Septe1nber 8, 1919~ the Secretary of State said
that the "War Departinent promises to issue strict orders
against repetitions."
The ~1exican Ambassador sent a further communication to the Secretary of State on October 25, 1919:
"It has been reported to my Government that on the 23rd of
of this month, at eleven a. 111., an army aeroplane from Douglas,
Arizona, flew at a height of about eight hundred meters above
X ogales, Arizona, near the boundary line. The crew fired a
machine gun several tiines. and so1ne of the bullets carried as far
as Xogales, Sonora, one hitting a dwelling where it luckily caused
no bodily injury.
"Under instructions received to that effect from my Govenunent, I have the honor to bring the foregoing to Your Excellency's knowledge with a request that you kindly use your good
offices to have the facts investigated and suitable punishment
brought upon those who 1nay be found guilty.
'·I take [etc.]
Y. BoNILLAS.''
(Ibid., 564.)

To this communication the Acting Secretary of State
replied on December 26:
"With further reference to Your Excellency's note No. E-4670
of October 25, 1919, concerning a report to the effect that on
October 23rd the crew of a United States Army Aeroplane fir~d
into the town of Nogales, Sonora, I have the honor to say that
I am now in receipt of a communication from the branch of
this Government to which the 1natter was referred stating that
a careful investigation fails to disclose such an occurrence on
October 23rd. I am officially informed, however, that a Lientenant in the Air Service of the United States Army is being
tried by a General Court l\Iartial on the charge of having fired
into the town of Nogales on October 19, 1919.
'"Accept [etc.]
FRANK L. POLK:'
(Ibid., p. 565.)

Aircraft in distress, etc.-While naval vessels in distress have been allowed to enter neutral jurisdiction for
1820-37-6
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repairs necessary to n1ake the vessel sernYorthy, the obligation to intern a belligerent aircraft entering neutral
jurisdiction is con1prchcnsiYe except for flying ambulances and aircraft upon Yessels of ''ar.
During the "\Vorld
ar, 191-!-18, no exceptions 'vere
1nade for disability, error, fog, or other reasons. Aircraft crossing a neutral frontier 'Yere shot do".. n-in
some cases on sight. This accords 'vith the rules subsequently dra,Yn up at The Hague, 1923:

'V

':Article 40.
"Belligerent n1ilitary aircraft are forbidden to enter the juris·
diction of a neutral State. * * *
"Article 42. A neutral Government must use the means at it~
disposal to prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of belligerent
n1ilitary aircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered
such jurisdiction.
"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to
intern ariy belligerent military aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together
with its crew and the passengers, if any." (1924 Naval 'Var
College, International Documents, pp. 131, 133.)

The obligation to intern the aircraft also extends to
passengers, personnel, and contents. The report of the
Con11nission of Jurists in 1923 says of internment,
'·It is an obligation owed to the opposing belligerent and is
based upon the fact that the aircraft has come into an area where
it is not subject to attack by its opponent." (Ibid., p. 133.)

. 4ircraft
.
and neutral jurisdiction.-During the "\Vorld

''r

ar the question of the relation of aircraft to neutral
jurisdiction for the first tin1e became one of major importance. In general, entrance by belligerent aircraft to
the air above neutral territory '"as prohibited. Questions as to entrance of the air aboYe neutral territorial
'"aters arose and this right "~as denied. .....<\.ircraft resting
upon and remaining upon Yessels of " . ar 'vere regarded
ns parts of the vessel and the vessel 'vas not discriminated
against because having aircraft. Aircraft carriers are
not to be excluded if other vessels of \Var are admitted
t hou_gh the aircraft n1ust re1nain on the carrier.

SPAIGHT, AND RICHl\lOND ON AIRCRAFT
~1r.
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J. M. Spaight says of aircraft and neutral

jurisdiction :
"The important question whether the laws of neutrality allow
belligerent military aircraft to come and go in neutral jurisdiction
was answered by the practice of 1914-18 with a firm and unmistakable negative. The unanimity of the answer was remarkable.
All the neutral States who had occasion to decide the question
decided it in the same general way, and their decision gave rise to
no protest on the part of the belligerents concerned, with one single exception, which the subsequent action and cmnpliance of the
State making it deprived of all its force. The Netherlands, Switzerland, Den1nark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, and Italy, Roumania,
Bulgaria, and China, while still neutral, showed by words or acts
or both that they adhered to the principle of prohibition of belligerent air entry, coupled with the obligation of the neutral State to
intern any aircraft and airmen effecting entry in face of such prohibition. How general was the acceptance of this principle was
shown by the fact that even in Persia, in which British, Russian,
and Turkish land forces had been already fighting for two years,
an att(•mpt was made to intern a British pilot-Lieut. Browningwhen he flew to Teheran in January, 1918. His aeroplane had
been stripped of its machine-guns and other armament on the Persian frontier-"so that he should not violate neutrality," says
Lieut. Col Tennant-but, notwithstanding this, the Swedish gendarmerie at Teheran proposed to intern him, and were only prevented from doing so by the Cossacks who were present in superior
numbers to the Swedes." (Air Power and 'Var Rights, 2d ed.,
p. 421.)

Adm.i ral Richmond on rules for aircraft.-The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 proposed an agreeJnent restricting the use of submar]nes which was never
ratified. At the London Naval Conference of 1930 the
submarine ""'as for certain purposes put under the rules
for surface vessels of war. Of this Admiral Richmond,
'vriting a fe,v years later, said:
"The Conference which sat in London agreed that it is contrary to humanity that merchant ships should be sunk by submarines, and that the rules which govern surface vessels apply
with equal weight to submarines: that is to say, that the act of
sinking a merchant ship by means of a torpedo was condemned.
It is curious that the same rules should not have been applied
to the air flotilla, for there is no intrinsic difference between
sinking a vessel with a torpedo fired from an underwater craft,
and sinking her with a torpedo fired or a bomb from a craft which
navigates above the surface. Presumably, the conduct of aircraft was imagined to be a rna tter of 'air warfare' with which
the Conference had nothing to do: if so, it illustrates how un-
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fortunate it is to approach questions of this kind in the subjective manner. If aircraft bad been recognised to be what they
are, flying torpedo-boats and gun-boats, units of sea power, this
illqgical discrimination could not have been made." * * *
''If. however, it should be resolutely declared that what is not
tolerable in a submarine is not tolerable in any other forn1 of
vessel: that weakness or technical inability to fulfil certain
conditions does not release an instrument from obligations which
bind other instruments; then it would follow that this form of
nttack [sinking surface craft] was illegal. Illegality, it may be
said, does not matter: each nation rnay have its own view on
that question; and though one may elect to consider an act illegal,
that decision bas no binding effect upon another who thinks
otherwise, and to whom the partie.ular practice appears adYantageous. But illegality is not so easily disposed of. It is a
1naxiin that illegal acts justify retaliation. Those who considel'
attack in this form upon the noncombatant merchant ship to
be illegal ar~ at complete liberty to warn those who take the
other view that they hold themselves entirely free to adopt
whatever measures of retaliation tbey 1nay choose. If the civilian
in the ship is to be shot or drowned; if instead of legal condemna tiou by a Prize Court, summary execution is to be the
practice; and if direct protection against these abnormal practices :-:hould vrove, in the nature of things, to be ilnpossible, the
people threatened with this form of sea-hooliganisni n1ay find
itself constrained to use 1neasures equally detestable and more
far-reaching. The bombardment of the civilian on the sea nwy
he answered by the bombardment of the civilian in coastal
towns and cities. 'Vbere it would end, it is impossible to say.
\Yhat is called 'civilisation' had produced, until the War of
1914-18, certain agreements to limit the acts of war. It was
recognised that indiscriminate conduct was, in the end, disadYantageons: that it caused suffering while doing nothing towards
attaining the final object of war, which is Peace. The removal
of those restraints upon certain forms of warfare profited no
one in the recent war, and, from the profound hatreds which
were created, bas been one of the principal obstacles in the re~nmption of peace."
(Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, "Sea
Power in the ~1odern \Vorld", pp. 146-49.)

1-."'etherlands American Stea1n LVavigatlon Co. Y. H. ill.
Procurator General~ 1925.-The detention by British
authorities for forty-one days in 1915 of a Yessel helonging to a Nether lands American Company led to a
clai1n for the loss of the use of the vessel. This claim
in appeal fron1 the 1\Tar Con1pensation Court can1e before the l(ing's Bench Division of the High Cour_t of
,Justice and judg1nents " . ere deliYerecl N overnber 9, 1925.
The Court through Bankes L. J .. stated:

CASE OF SOl\fl\IELSDIJI(
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"There is no dispute about the facts, which can be stated quite
shortly. Early in the month of October, 1915, the respondents'
Yessel, the Som1nelsdi.jlc, was on a voyage from Buenos Ayres to
Helsingborg and :Malmo with a cargo of maize, linseed and bran.
On or about October 15, when the vessel entered the Downs,
she was detained by H. 1\1. Naval Patrols and searched, as far as
it \vas possible to search her, without discharging her cargo
and bunkers. The detention in the Downs continued until October 25, when an armed guard and a pilot were placed on board,
and order:-; were given that the vessel was to proceed to London, and then. quoting the language of the master in para.
13 of his affidavit: 'The ship was taken to Gravesend accompanie•l by a torpedo-boat from the Edinburgh Channel, and
brought to an anchor at Gravesend,' and from Gravesend the
vessel was taken up into the Royal Albert Dock and there thoroughly searched, her cargo for that purpose being discharged
After the search was completed, the cargo was reloaded, and
ultimately on December 5, again quoting the master's language: 'The ship was allowed to resume her voyage.' * * *
The question for decision in the present case is whether the
modern practice of carrying out the right of visit and search
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the commission.
In the absence of any authority to the contrary it would seen1
that the means adopted under the present practice of carrying
out a visit and search would amply justify a finding of a
seizure. What more is wanted than the forcible detention of a
Yessel, follo"~ed by the placing of an armed guard on board
in order to compel the carrying out of orders that the vessel
is to proceed to some named port and there to remain until
allowed to proceed?" (Netherlands American Steam Navigation
Company -z:. H. l\1. Procurator General, 1 I(. B. [1926] 8-!, 93.)

In this case Scrutton, L. J ., said:
"\Vhat had happened to the Sonunelsdijlc was agreed by counsel to be that in exercise of the belligerent rights of search she
had been detained in the Downs, then brought to London with an
armed crew of forces of the Crown on board and in charge of one
of His 1\lajesty's destroyers, there searched and ultimately
released.
"It was common ground that before the war the belligerent
right of search of neutral vessels was usually exercised at sea,
but that during the war the presence of submarines and the size
of Inodern ships led to an extension of that procedure. by which
the neutral ship was brought into port for examination. without
being necessarily brought before the Prize Court for adjudication.
Oppenheim (International Law, vol. ii., 429) speaks of capture or
seizure 'because grave suspicion demands a further enquiry which
can be carried out in a port only.' and (184) that 'seizure is
effected by securing possession of the vessel through the captor
sending an officer and some of his own crew on board,' 0r directing her to steer according to the captor's orders. I cannot doubt
that what happened here was a 'seizure,' the legality of which
could be in,~estigated in the Admir.11ty sitting in Prize, which
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also would deal with any claim for compensation for undue delay
in seizure and ex~unination. The President inforn1ed us that
such 1natters had been frequently dealt with by the Admiralty
sitting in Prize, and we were supplied with a list of cases supporting his \iew." (Ibid., 97.)

Atkin, L. J., concurring in the san1e case, said:
"If there were an immediate intention at the commencen1ent
of the operation to bring the vessel in for adjudication, there
would be an obvious capture, and in my opinion it n1akes no
difference that the present intention is to bring her in for search,
with the further intention if the search results in a particular
way to ha\e the \essel or goods adjudicated. It cannot be
doubted that the practice of the Priz~ Court in this country bas
been to act on this \iew. I have no doubt 1nyself that in proper
circumstances the owners of a vessel or goods so brought in for
search alleging unreasonable delay may apply to the Prize Court
for relief, and that the Prize Court bas jurisdiction in such a case
to order release; and further bas jurisdiction to award compensation if the ship has been brought in for search unreasonalJly
or otherwise in the course of the search bas been treated unreasonably. It would be remarkable if the result were otherwise,
for in the absence of domestic legislation in the belligerent country·
the neutral owner would apparently be without re1nedy." (Ibid.,
100.)

Radio.-The use of "Tireless telegraphy early in the
t'ventieth century had shown that international regulations 'vere essential, because some of the proposed national restrictions would not be generally acceptable.
Regulations as to use of 'vireless telegraphy in ti1ne of
peace 'vere not particularly difficult to devise as is evident in the Berlin Convention of 1906, in the London
Convention, 1912, and in others of later date. The restrictions upon the erection of "~ireless stations and use
of wireless telegraphy in time of war in neutral territory,
provided in V Hague Convention of 1907, covered only a
part of the problems that soon arose. The proclainations and decrees during the "~orld war varied greatly
in character and effectiveness, and an attempt "~as made
to set forth the rules for the use of radio and aircraft
in the Report of the Con1mission of Jurists, The Hague,
1923.

"CSE OF RADIO
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The I-Iague Convention
of 1907 had forbidden the
erection by belligerents of a 'vireless or like station on
neutral territory or the use of such installation established before the 'var for military purposes unless it had
also been open for service of public messages.
On the outbreak of the \Vorld \Var~ s,vitzerland, .A. ugust 2, 1914, forbade the installation of new radio stations
and the use of existing stations.
Some states included under the prohibited means of
communication, optical apparatus, lights, flags, etc., and
required dismantling of radio apparatus on all vessels
entering their 'vaters. The use of radio except on Canal
business 'vas forbidden by the United States to all belligerent vessels in the Panan1a Canal Zone. The regulations in regard to the use of radio issued by South
.1\.merican
.
states were often very detailed.
In referring to su1n1nons by aircraft in the Naval
''Tar College, International La'' Situations, 1930, it ''"as
said:
"Summons of a merchant Yessel is the means by which the
attention of such a vessel is drawn to a vessel of war which
desires to communicate with the merchant. vessel. The sumn1ons
1nay be by signal flag or by an other effective method. There
is not any necessary implication that the use of force is contemplated. Visit and search may or may not follow the summons.
There seen1s to be no reason why the use of radio may not be
as lawful as any other means of attracting attention or why
an aircraft may not summon a 1nerchant vessel as well as any
other craft." (1930 NaYal 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 102.)

Resunu3.-In the X a val \\Tar College International
Law· Situations, 1930, pages 98 to 135, there is a discussion of the use of aircraft. It was sho,vn that practice
and court decisions logically regarded an aircraft attached to a vessel and the personnel of the aircraft as a
part of the equipment and personnel of the vessel of ''ar.
The British and to some degree the Italian point of view
favored deviation for visit and search. "'I'o proceed as
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directed" after seizure, unless under escort, or after a
prize cre'v had been placed upon the seized Yessel, is not
an accepted obligation under international law. Some
states decline to admit any obligation to the belligerents
as resting upon its vessels to folio"· a routing unless the
force to make the orders effective is present, and only so
long as it is present. In eYery case the orders of the
visiting vessels whether naYal or air craft, must be made
know·n to and be understood by the visited craft before
responsibility for carrying out the orders can be prestnnecl. Upon the high sea Yessels Inay be 1net whose
radio apparatus Inay not be 'vorking or the instructions
1nay be misunderstood.
During the early stages of the deYelopment of aircraft,
there "'as uncertainty as to the obligations of neutral
states in regard to the use of the superjacent air by
belligerents. Gradually the absolute prohibition of such
use became the accepted rule. Of course, in case of dist ress an aircraft might seek a landing in neutral jurisdiction but it 'vould be interned 'vith the personnel.
Aircraft might be brought 'vithin neutral jurisdiction
on a vessel 'vhich might lawfully be permitted to enter,
but they must not be separated from the vessel under
liability to internment.
SOLUTIOX

(a) 1. The Ya-10 should not use force against the X ala
till certain that the Xala has received and understood
the summons. \Vhen certain that sumn1ons has been
1·eceived and is understood, the Y (J;-10 may use force
sufficient only to bring the X ala to the Y aga under escort
or in case of persistent or active resistance, the Y a-10
1nay sink the X ala, after assuring the safety of passengers, crew, and papers.
2. The Y a-10 should not use force against the X ala
till certain that the Xala has received and understood
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the sun1n1ons. 'Vhen certain that sunllllons has been
receiYed and is understood, the Ya-10 1nay use force
sufficient only to bring the X ala to the Y aga under escort
or in case of persistent or active resistance, the 17 a-10
1nay sink the ""Yala, after assuring the safety of passengers, crew, and papers.
3. The Y a-10 should not use force against the X ala
till certain that the X ala has received and understood the
summons. "'\Vhen certain that.SUllllllOUS has been received
and is understood, the Y a-1 0 1nay use force sufficient
only to bring the Xala to the Yaga under escort. If
the Ya-10 decides not to incur risk from the approaching
cruiser of X, the Y ar-10 may take no further action in
regard to the X ala.
4. If a 1nerchant vessel of neutral state N, the LVela,
should be summoned by theYar-10 under conditions identical to (1), (2), and (3) above, the same action may bs
taken.
(b) The commander of the Ya-10 being already certain that the summons is received, should also be certain
that it is understood, 'vhen he may proceed as in (1),
(2), (3), and ( 4) above.
(c) 1. State l( should use due diligence to intern the
Pa-11, an aircraft of state Y.
2·. State 0 should use due diligence to intern the
Pa-11, an aircraft of state Y, and if the tanker of state
Y has furnished fuel to the Pa-11, should intern the
tanker.
3. State R should request the Yema to turn over the
Par-11 for internment and if the request is not granted,
should use due diligence to intern the Yerna 'vith the
Pa-11 on board.

